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Comparative Law in a Time of Globalization: Some
Reflections
Thomas C. Kohler*
"Now it seems to some people that everything just is merely legal, since what is natural is unchangeable and equally valid
everywhere-fire, e.g., burns both here and in Persia-while
they see that what is just changes from city to city. This is not
so, though in a way it is so."'

"There are, it is said, one hundred and fifty-four customs in
France which possess the force of law. These laws are almost
all different in different places. A man that travels in this
country changes his law almost as often as he changes his
The Lord pity us!'
horses ....

"The simpler the laws and the more general the regulations become, the more despotic, arid and wretched a state becomes."3

I will use this happy occasion celebrating the work of Mary Ann
Glendon for some short reflections on some ancient questions that
have appeared in a new guise, and upon which analysis from a
comparative perspective can shed some light. The problems strike
at the heart of the very idea of law itself. Is law merely conventional, a set of local, customary (and thereby divergent) practices,
whose legitimacy or reasonableness is implied from long use? Or,

* Concurrent Professor of Law and Philosophy, Boston College Law School.
1.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 [1134b 25] (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett

Publishing 1985) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
2. FRANQOIS-MARIE AROUET (VOLTAIRE), A Philosophical Dictionary, vol. IV ("Customs-Usages") in VIII THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE: A CONTEMPORARY VERSION (William F.

Fleming trans., 1901).
3. JUSTUS MOSER, Der jetzige Hang zu allgemeinen Gesetzen und Verordungen ist der
gemeinen Freiheitgefahrlich [The Current Tendency to Universal Laws and Administrative
Regulations is a Danger to Common Freedom] (1772) in 5 JUSTUS MOSERS SAMMTLICHE
WERKE: HISTORISCHE-KRITISCHE AUSGABE IN 14 BANDEN 22, 23 (1943).
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can only a norm universally recognized and applied enjoy the status of being law?
A brief address given by Professor Glendon at a small conference held in Florence in June of this year, in which we both participated, triggered these ruminations. In the course of her remarks,
entitled, "The Adventure of Comparative Law," she noted that,
until recently, American lawyers had precious little interest in
foreign law. However, with the advance of globalization, the situation has changed. American law schools, she observed, have
quickly expanded their international programs. Today, any law
school worth its salt has offerings in international business law
and public international law. Nevertheless, she remarked, it is
not clear what role, if any, comparative law will have in this new
atmosphere. Becoming a comparatist, she points out, involves
some rather heavy and sustained lifting: "Just as it takes considerable investment of time and effort to acquire a working
knowledge of one's own legal system, it takes similar investment,
and additional years of study, to become familiar with that of another country, especially if other languages must be mastered."
Of course, the work involved in becoming a comparatist does not
stop there. Law mirrors a people's history, values, beliefs, and
culture, within and through which it seeks to deal with specific
problems and crises in some normative way. As students of our
own law, we begin our work as beings steeped in our culture.
Even if not well examined, as "natives" we bring to our undertaking at least some aboriginal sense of the history and the shared
meanings within which our legal system developed. Perspectives
from the human sciences, and perhaps particularly intellectual
history and philosophy, play a crucial role in informing and deepening our understanding of our own legal system, and assist us in
developing a critical framework by which to evaluate the evolution
and trajectory of our law and its specific doctrines. No one, absent
such work, could be considered a well-formed lawyer, but at best,
a severely myopic technician.
If such perspectives represent an important aspect of the study
of one's own law, they stand as an absolute requisite to even the
most basic understanding of a foreign system. By its very nature,
comparative law constitutes an interdisciplinary undertaking, and
one that is so at several levels. As Lord Wedderburn has remarked of comparative work in labor law, "the language of a labour law system can be learned only from its social history, above
all the history of its labour movement. Without a smattering of
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that vocabulary comparative conversation is impossible."' His
comments hardly restrict themselves to the labor field. Successful
comparative investigation in any area involves a wide and deep
familiarity with another culture, and an ability to see how various
aspects of the law and its historical development come together.
The advice given by the great medieval scholar, Hugh of St. Victor, to students generally applies with special force to would-be
comparatists. "Learn everything," he counseled, "you will see afterwards that nothing is superfluous."'
So, what distinguishes a comparatist from an internationalist?
Perhaps one goes not too wide of the mark by answering, detail,
and a lively sensitivity to and respect for the experiences, ideas
and cultures of others. International law constitutes, more or less,
a closed and self-referential system. By and large, it represents
the creation of elites. It tends to serve the needs of large, transnational organizations that want uniformity and predictability and
that typically have only tenuous particular or local ties, even to
the increasingly powerless nation-states. International law has
developed its own norms at an abstract level, generating universals and prescinding from the creative if messy diversity of indigenous rules, doctrines and practices. As a result, Glendon notes,
"public international lawyers, international civil servants, and
international NGOs are often impatient with, or even dismissive
of, national differences." That from which an internationalist typically abstracts or ignores constitutes the core of the comparatists'
work.
The tension between local ordering and the demand for a universal scheme based on "rational" principles is an old one. In
large degree, it congeals the arguments between the champions of
the Enlightenment project who both proposed and imposed a new
order, and its critics, such as Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Justus Mdser, who is quoted at the start of these reflections.
In response to the "geometrical and arithmetical" plans of "mechanics of Paris," for example, Burke demanded of their authors,
"do you seriously think that the territory of France, upon the republican system of eighty-three independent municipalities (to say
4. Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Social Charter in Britain-LabourLaw and
Labour Courts?, 54 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991).
5. HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR, THE DIDASCALICON OF HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR: A
MEDIEVAL GUIDE TO THE ARTS 137 (Jerome Taylor trans., 1991). "A skimpy knowledge," he
continues, "is not a pleasing thing."
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nothing of the parts that compose them), can ever be governed as
one body, or can ever be set in motion by the impulse of one
mind?" How could it be, he insisted, that "three or four thousand
democracies should be formed into eighty-three, and that they
may all, by some sort of unknown attractive power, be organized
into one?"' Not only do these small and varied institutions enable
grassroots self-determination. They also, Burke observed, generate the glue that binds people both within and across borders: "to
love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle
(the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the
series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to
mankind."'
In The Old Regime and the Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville
notes that sometime during the middle of the Eighteenth Century,
"a certain number of writers appeared who specialized in treating
questions of public administration and to whom several similar
principles have given the common name of economists or physiocrats." They may have had less renown than the philosophes,
Tocqueville states, but "it is in their writings above all that we can
best study the Revolution's true nature." "All the institutions that
the Revolution was going to permanently abolish," he continues,
"had been the particular objects of the physiocrats' attacks; none
had found grace in their eyes."' "Whatever hinders their plans,"
he observes, "is worthless" and "diversity itself is odious to them."
These theorists showed "themselves hostile to deliberative assemblies, to local and secondary powers, and in general to all the
counterweights which had been established in different times,
among all free peoples, to balance the central power." They demanded the abolition of anything "that disturbed the symmetry of
their plans." "They were," Tocqueville points out, "very favorable
to the free exchange of commodities, to laissez faire or laissez
passer in trade and industry, but as for political freedoms proper,"
they demonstrated little or no concern."o
6.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 142 (Conor Cruise

O'Brien ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1790).
7. Id. at 144.
8. Id. at 135.
9.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 209 (Frangois

Furet & Franqois Mdlonio eds., Alan S. Kahan, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1856).
Tocqueville also notes that one of the physiocrats "proposed to eliminate at once all the old
territorial divisions and to change all the provinces' names, forty years before the Constituent Assembly did it." Id. at 210.
10. Id. at 210.
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Examples of the tension that Burke and Tocqueville describe
can be multiplied many times over. The widespread displacement
of local laws and customs through the "reception" of the Roman
law throughout much of Europe during the late middle ages," or
the imposition of the Code Napoldon in the Western German territories after the French-imposed reforms in the wake of 180612 provide just two further instances. As Aristotle instructs us, however, diversity in laws and customs does not imply that all law is
merely conventional or simply an expression of power and lacking
in reason. In the tradition that he represents, law constitutes an
expression of practical wisdom, of what we might call prudence.
As he also points out, prudent action depends on the circumstances, which vary just as reasonable responses to those circumstances
may vary. A number of approaches to a common problem may be
equally sensible. Circumstances change. What does not is the
operation of the normative person in being attentive, intelligent,
reasonable, and responsible in making judgments about what to
do in concrete situations. The patterns of human experience vary,
but the operations of human reason do not. The old "internationalism," as it were, focuses on the invariant operations of the person in deliberating, valuing, and choosing. The modern, in contrast, shifts the focus from persons and their reasonable operations to the rules themselves, emphasizing their abstract universality and uniformity.
Of course, none of this denies the significance or the role of international law. It has assumed a quickly growing role, and its
higher profile seems with us to stay. Local does not necessarily
mean good, and some matters, e.g., environmental concerns, often
cannot be treated effectually on a local or even a national basis
alone. Moreover, efforts like the creation of the European Union
inspire admiration and bear real promise, despite the various difficulties and complications that have attended it. I simply want to
point out that in a time of globalization, where the drive to uniformity and homogenization threaten to uproot and displace local
orders and indigenous responses to problems, not to mention entire cultures, insights from comparative law can play a usefully
corrective role. Comparative perspectives not only leave us with a
11. On this theme, see GERALD STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE: THE
OPPOSITION To ROMAN LAW IN REFORMATION GERMANY (1986).
12. For a thorough and insightful treatment, see ELISABETH FEHRENBACH,
TRADITIONALE GESELLSCHAFT UND REVOLUTIONARES RECHT: DIE EINF10HRUNG DES CODE
NAPOLEON IN DEN RHEINBUNDSTAATEN (1974).
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greater appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of our own
legal schemes. Such perspectives also highlight the unique aspects and institutions of other systems, thereby alerting us to the
costs of their being supplanted by transnational norms.
One could undoubtedly pose a long string of examples of this
sort of displacement and supplanting, but I find the decisions of
the European Court of Justice in the highly controversial Vikingl
and Lavall4 cases particularly poignant and illustrative. Both
cases deal with the collision between private, grassroots-level
lawmaking between the parties through collective bargaining, as
protected and structured by national law and the transnational
legal scheme erected through the European Union. These are
somewhat complicated cases that raise a number of issues, and
any extended discussion or analysis of them would be out of place
here. A short recitation may give a sense of threats and potential
problems, however.
In Viking, a Finnish company operated a ferry, the Rosella,
which sailed under the Finnish flag and travelled between Finland and Estonia. The crew of the Rosella were members of the
Finnish Seamen's Union and covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Because Estonian labor costs were significantly lower,
the company proposed re-flagging the Rosella in Estonia and entering into a collective agreement with an Estonian union. The
Finnish union, with the support of the International Transport
Workers Federation, which opposes re-flagging when the company's seat would remain in another country, took fully legal steps
under Finnish law to boycott the Rosella and to employ other legally sanctioned economic pressure. As a result of this collective
action, the company withdrew the proposal to re-flag its ship, but
sought an injunction in an English court on the grounds that the
unions' actions breached Article 49 of the European Union treaty,
which guarantees the "freedom of establishment," i.e., the freedom
to carry on business in EU member states."5

13. Viking Line ABP v. Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n, the Finnish Seaman's Union, Case
C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 [hereinafter Viking].
14. Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenske Byggnadsarbetarefbrbundet, Case C-341/05,
[2007] E.C.R. 1-11767 [hereinafter Laval].
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
49 (ex EC Treaty art. 43), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 67 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 49 is supplemented by TFEU art. 56 [ex E.C. Treaty art. 49] 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 70,
which guarantees the freedom to provide cross-border services. It is not always clear under
which Article activity might be protected or affected.
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The much commented upon and criticized decision 6 of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")" in this matter points in two directions. The Court first brushed aside contentions that questions
dealing with workers' associational freedoms, the right to strike
and the right to impose other forms of economic pressure fall
without the scope of EU law, in part because the extension of
Community-protected economic freedoms would interfere with
national social policy as embodied in national legal schemes.1 8
Citing cases dealing with matters such as social security and taxation, the Court noted that even while legislating in areas that lay
outside Community competence, enactments and regulations in
these areas promulgated by member states had to comply with
Community law. The Court further made clear that the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement for workers," as well as freedom of
establishment and the right to provide cross-border services, applied to unions as well as to state actors-the so-called "horizontal
effect."2 0 As Catherine Bernard points out,21 this ruling places unions-private associations charged with the duty of protecting
their members' interests-in the same position as states and with

16.

See, e.g., CATHERINE BERNARD, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW 202 n.75 (4th ed. 2012) (col-

lecting sources); A.C.L. Davies, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval
Cases in the ECJ, 37 INDUS. L.J. 126 (2008). For a concise analysis and critique from the
perspective of German law, see Bertram Zwanziger, Arbeitskampf- und Tarifrecht nach
den EuGHEntscheidungen "Laval" und "Viking," DER BETRIEB, Feb. 8, 2008, at 294.
17. Renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon and now known as the "Court of Justice of the
European Union" (CJEU). Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art.,
May 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/01) 13, 22.
18. TFEU, art. 153, $[ 5, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 114 provides that "[tihe
provisions of this Article [dealing with the power of the Community to legislate or impose
standards concerning the social rights of workers] shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs." These matters are reserved to
national regulation.
19. TFEU, art. 45 (ex EC Treaty art. 39), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 65-66.
20. The Court stated that "according to settled case-law," TFEU Articles 45, 49 and 56
"do not apply only to the actions of public authorities but extend also to rules of any other
nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment, self-employment
and the provisions of services . . . ." Viking, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779, 1 33.
"Since working conditions in different Member States are governed sometimes by provisions laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by collective agreements and other acts
concluded or adopted by private persons," the Court explained, "limiting application of the
prohibitions laid down by these articles to acts of a public authority would risk creating
inequality in its application . . . ." Id. 1 34.
21. BERNARD, supra note 16, at 204.
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the same responsibilities, but leaves them unable to rely upon the
defenses to decisions provided to states by TFEU Article 52.22
Having ruled that unions would be governed by the same duties
as states, the Court proceeded to recognize the right to strike "as a
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general
principles of Community law,"23 but then required that it be limited by the other economic rights stated in Community law. As a
result of this ruling, employers may challenge a union's use of otherwise legal economic pressure as infringing on an employer's free
movement rights. Community law now trumps the underlying
ordering scheme established by national law, at least in transnational settings. That point raises the question of threshold: in an
integrated economy, the parties to a dispute cannot confine the
economic impact of strikes, boycotts, or other permissible economic
pressure tactics solely to themselves. How much economic impact
does it take to turn a "local" dispute into one that has impermissible effects on another's freedom of establishment or rights to offer
cross-border services? Could a third party, disadvantageously affected by a strike or other union economic pressure, but not the
primary object of it, nevertheless claim that its freedom to conduct
business or to offer services across borders has been interfered
with unlawfully?
These questions aside, the union's defense in situations like that
in Viking will depend upon a judicial determination that its actions were justified and were proportionately exercised. In other
words, employee associations-unions-bear the burden of justifying the use of any form of economic pressure. Although a fundamental right, a strike appears to begin with the presumption of
invalidity, and the unions bear the risk in employing it. The
standards for legality are rather hazy and the potential costs of
misjudging how a court retrospectively will view the application of
economic pressure are potentially high. Nevertheless, the ECJ's
judgment betrays no sense of concern with the chilling effect its
ruling may have on the exercise of what it recognized as fundamental rights. It also ignores the fact, long recognized by the
United States Supreme Court, that the ability to control the tim22. TFEU, art. 52, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 69. For a roughly analogous
situation that placed a union in an invidious position by legally requiring it to represent a
minority interest against the majority of its members, as embodied in the application of the
neutral principle of seniority, see Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th
Cir. 1980).
23. Viking, Case C-438/05, [20071 E.C.R. 1-10779, 1 44.
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ing and the rationale for the use of economic pressure leads to the
ability to control the outcome of industrial disputes. 24 The ruling
threatens to juridify considerably a process originally conceived of
as autonomous norm-setting, one described by Gunther Teubner
as a scheme of "reflexive" lawmaking.2 5
In the Laval26 case, Laval, a Latvian contracting firm, won a
contract to perform construction services on a school building in
Sweden. Laval posted thirty-five of its own workers from Latvia
to work on sites operated by "Baltic," a firm incorporated under
Swedish law whose entire share capital was owned by Laval.27
The posted workers were paid at rates substantially lower than
Swedish construction workers.
To protest Laval's payment of sub-standard wages, and with the
goal of having Laval adopt standards established by Swedish collective agreements, Swedish construction trade unions picketed
the worksite and employed other economic pressure tactics, all of
which were in accord with and protected by Swedish law. With
the backing of the Swedish employers' association, Laval successfully challenged the unions' actions as a breach of the freedom to
provide cross-border services under TFEU Article 56. Confirming
that Article 56 applied to unions as well as to states,2 8 the Court
ruled that since Laval had paid its posted workers in accord with
standards applicable in Latvia, any attempt to impose the standards applicable in a host state violated Article 56.29 The judgment
24. Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd. v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
25. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
LAw & Soc. REV. 229 (1983). Reflexive law refers to a scheme intended only to erect procedural and organizational norms within which private ordering can occur. The goal of such
ordering is "regulated autonomy." Such a scheme also represents an expression of the
subsidiarity principle. Subsidiarity emphasizes self-administration by putting authority
for decision-making at the lowest possible social or political level. It also requires larger
bodies to supply assistance (subsidium) where required to support the smaller body or take
over tasks they cannot perform.
26. Laval, Case C-341/05, [20071 E.C.R. 1-11767.
27. The Court dismissed arguments that because:
the share capital of Laval and of Baltic were held by the same persons, and those
companies had the same representatives and used the same trademark, they should
be regarded as one and the same economic entity from the point of view of Community law, even though they constitute two separate legal persons. Therefore, Laval was
under an obligation to pursue its activity in Sweden under the conditions laid down
for its own nationals by the legislation of that Member State, for the purposes of the
second paragraph of Article 43 EC.
Laval, Case C-341/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767, 43.
28. Id. 95.
29. For further analysis of this case and its implications under EU law, see sources in
supra note 16.

Duquesne Law Review

110

Vol. 52

also analyzed the provisions and applicability of the Community's
Posted Workers Directive.3 0
Laval and Viking illustrate the enormously strong undertow
embedded in transnational schemes that act to de-tether and supplant both national and more localized, grassroots systems of ordering. They also exemplify the elevation of concern for the functioning of efficient markets over political freedoms and selfgovernance that Tocqueville had warned of in the plans of the
physiocrats.3 1 In this, Laval and Viking do not stand alone.
In its Schmidberger3 2 judgment, for example, the ECJ suggested
that a duty could exist on the part of Member States to restrict
constitutionally protected freedoms of expression and assembly
when their exercise would disproportionately burden the fundamental right to the free movement of goods. The Schmidberger
Court stated that, "unlike other fundamental rights enshrined" in
the European Convention on Civil Rights ("ECHR"), "such as the
right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in
relation to its social purpose."33 Having concluded that rights to
the free movement of goods stand on an equal footing with rights
of expression and assembly, the Court balanced the interests. 3 4 It
found, on the facts of the instant case, that Austria had not infringed Community law by failing to enjoin a citizen demonstration that closed the roadway through the Brenner Pass for about
twenty-eight hours to protest the danger to public health posed by
increasing heavy goods traffic through the Pass, and to persuade
authorities to reduce traffic and pollution in that environmentally
sensitive region. Once again, it appears that any restriction on
commercial activity such as the free movement of goods presumptively enjoys protection against interference, even if that interfer30. Directive 1996/71/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services,
1997 O.J. (L 18) 1.
31. See text accompanying supra notes 9-10.
32. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzige v. Austria, Case C112/00, [20031 E.C.R. 1-5659.

33.

Id. T 80.

34. While observing that "competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion," the
Court stated, "Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed
upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights." Id. 82.
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ence comes through the means of protected speech and assembly.
The burden is on the Member State to demonstrate that its "failure to ban can be objectively justified."" If nothing else, the case
spurs some interesting speculation, if not dark concerns, about the
way the Court may strike the balance in the future.
Manfred Weiss sagely but undoubtedly controversially observes
that criticism of the Court for these decisions is unfair." The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 aimed at the
establishment of a common market. Consequently, he points out,
it comes as no surprise that the free movement of goods and capital and the freedoms of services and establishment constituted the
cornerstones of the Treaty and its successors. The Court, he argues, has little wiggle room, and out of considerations for its own
legitimacy, it must work within the strict confines the Treaty establishes for it. The question for the Court in Viking and Laval
"was merely whether national law on industrial action was an unlawful restriction of the market freedoms of establishment, as
guaranteed in the EC Treaty." The Courts' authority to balance
rights or account for equities is, Weiss points out, quite limited:
"the Court took the market freedoms and the fundamental rights
as conflicting entities of equal value, trying to find a balance between them."3 8 "The two judgments show the general dilemma
resulting from the construction of the EU," he states. "Since the
Treaty [TFEU] . . . is still shaped according to the philosophy of

promoting market freedoms as much as possible," the Court has
limited ability to engage in balancing, which in any event "only
can be done by the Court incrementally."3 9 Even if the Court's "interpretation of public policy derogations is rather restrictive,"
Weiss observes, the Court finds itself confined by the "architecture
of the Treaty.""0 Perhaps Tocqueville would not have been surprised.
We hear a great deal today about multiculturalism, but the
trends associated with globalization appear headed much more
35. Id. 164.
36. Manfred Weiss, The Potentialof the Treaty has to be Used to Its Full Extent, 2013
EUR. LABOUR L.J. 24 (2013). In light of the decisions in Viking, Laval, and some companion
cases, Weiss states, "court-bashing has become a favourite sport of all those who do not like
the outcome of these Court rulings." He states that "[tihis court bashing is based on a very
narrow-minded and ill-founded perspective." Id. at 25-26.
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 27.

Duquesne Law Review

112

Vol. 52

strongly in a monocultural direction. Just over a century ago,
Max Weber resignedly warned that a deracinated and instrumental version of reason had come to dominate modernity, confining
us within an "iron cage" wherein all aspects of social life have been
progressively bureaucratized, and where relentless economic calculation has flattened and displaced all previous "irrational" patterns of living, while squeezing out all of the humane pleasantries
that once characterized them.4 ' Caught between the large structures of market or state, human possibilities limit themselves to
living, as Weber so pungently put it, as "specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart."4 2
Globalization in its present guise carries precisely this danger
for human societies, since its illumination springs from just the
ideas, forces, and embedded tendencies that Weber described. The
classic or pre-Enlightenment understanding described law as "an
ordinance of reason made for the public good,"4 3 or in its form as
the law embodied in the Corpus iurus, as representing "an unrivaled model of natural and civil rationality, if not an expression of
an authentic and immutable juridical metaphysics."4 4 A growing
demand for uniform, homogeneous international norms, justified
by claims of their rationality (in the Weberian sense), predictability, and as representing "best practices," has accompanied the rise
and spread of globalized trade, and transformed these understandings fully. Rather than acting as an autonomous architectonic
structure designed to order social relations and to secure some
rough version of human flourishing and the common good, law as
we now know it increasingly functions simply as the handmaid of
economic efficiency. We regard norms that obstruct such "efficiency" as irrational and illegitimate (and one should keep in mind
that goodness and legitimacy are, at bottom, entirely different criteria).
The demotion and restriction of reason as representing merely
the ability to calculate the most effective and economical means to
an end necessarily has had a substantial impact on our under41.

On this point, see JOACHIM RADKAU,

MAX WEBER:

DIE LEIDENSCHAFT DES

DENKENS 32-33 (2005) (discussing Weber's views concerning the effect of competition and
market structures on family relationships).
42. 1VIAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 124 (Talcott
Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1905).
43. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. Ia-Hea q. 90, art. 4 (Treatise on Law)
(1274).
44.

ALDO SCHIAVONE, THE INVENTION OF LAW IN THE WEST 15 (Jeremy Carden & An-

tony Shugaar, trans. 2012)
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standing of the significance and role of the law. It has other costs
and carries with it other long-term tendencies as well. "Instrumental reason," Charles Taylor observes:
has also grown along with a disengaged model of the human
subject, which has a great hold on our imagination. It offers
an ideal picture of human thinking that has disengaged from
its messy embedding in our bodily constitution, our dialogical
situation, our emotions, and our traditional life forms in order
to be pure, self-verifying rationality.4 5
In a world increasingly fascinated with and dominated by "virtual reality," where many spend much of their lives in a sort of
parallel existence, we easily can forget that we are embodied intellects, conditioned by our moods and emotions, and the state of our
"lower conjugates," our biochemical, cellular, neural, and other
physical systems that support and become sublated into our conscious life. Since the time of Descartes, the tendency has existed
to regard ourselves as pure mind, disengaged reason that exists
apart from our scruffy clay shells. However, as Eric Voegelin reminds us, our bodily existence forms the basis for our social existence. "Human consciousness," he observes, "is not a free-floating
something but always the concrete consciousness of concrete persons."" Voegelin warns that when we attempt:
to liberate consciousness from man's corporeality, there arise
symbols of order like the realm of the spirits, or the perfect
realm of reason to which mankind is approaching, or the
withering away of the state and the coming of the Third Reich
of the Spirit, or the realms of perfection that are expected as
the result of the metastasis of man to a homo novus or a superman, be it that of Marx or of Nietzsche.47
We forget what we truly are only at great peril.
Comparative approaches represent no panacea to these trends
and dangers. There is no magic about them. Comparative law,
however, offers an approach that puts the person back at the center, in a cultural and historical context, one subject both to development and decline, to intelligent responses as well as silly or
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short-sighted regimes. By paying attention to the diverse ordering
solutions that communities have mounted, comparative law also
can encourage an appropriate sense of intellectual modesty, one
that warns us of the dangers inherent in attempts to erect model
regimes that pay scant attention to the experiences of humans
over time, and that ignore the cultures and concrete circumstances
of others. Done correctly, comparative approaches can help to
shift the focus of our work from concerns with mere efficiency,
from abstraction, from a forgetfulness of our full humanity. In
other words, by focusing our attention on the whole, it can help us
re-engage with ourselves, and remind us that the real subject of
the law is the human. Today many celebrate "disruption," the
Rousseauian-tinged motto of the moment, and use it as something
of a programmatic theme. What could be more disruptive, at least
of typically unexamined trends and ideas, than seeking to make
law more human? That task constitutes the role of comparative
law in a time of globalization.

